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Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber:
The Racial Impact of Permanent Felon
Disenfranchisement in Florida
1.
The United States prescribes democracy like a pill that cures
nations from centuries of corruption, ill governance and religious con-
flict. Nonetheless, even the U.S. version of democracy has its faults.
Even in the 21st century, significant numbers of U.S. citizens who are
contributing to society are permanently excluded from the democratic
process. Felons' are the only class of mentally competent citizens still
denied the fundamental right to vote by the U.S. Constitution.2 The
most alarming effect of permanent felon disenfranchisement is the suc-
cess with which it accomplishes both discrimination against racial
minorities and the exclusion of an increasingly significant population
from the vote.
The philosophical rationales offered throughout modern history for
felon disenfranchisement were conspicuously absent from the hallmark
United States Supreme Court case upholding the practice in 1974, Rich-
ardson v. Ramirez.' In Richardson, the Court constructed a constitu-
tional sanctuary for the handful of remaining states that permanently
disenfranchise felons. The Court read section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as authorizing the disenfranchisement of felons irrespective
of the equal protection issues implicated by such a "stale" reading of the
Constitution.4 The post-Richardson era has seen a number of unsuccess-
ful attempts to challenge felon disenfranchisement under the Voting
Rights Act of 19651 rather than on constitutional grounds. I suggest that
felon disenfranchisement, specifically in Florida, deserves renewed con-
1. The term "felons" includes all individuals convicted of a felony and subsequently released
from prison.
2. The Fifteenth Amendment made it illegal to deny the right to vote on "account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Nineteenth Amendment
enfranchised women, and the Twenty-Fourth eliminated poll taxes, thereby enfranchising the poor
and frugal. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, XXIV. The Twenty-Third Amendment gave residents of
the District of Columbia a real vote in presidential elections and a phantom vote in the legislature.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. Finally, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment gave the right to vote to all
adults "who are eighteen years of age or older." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
3. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2000)) [hereinafter the Act].
1317
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sideration under the Voting Rights Act and, more importantly, modem
principles of equal protection.
6
On a global level, the United States is the champion of government
elected by the people. But in our own country the permanent disen-
franchisement of felons strips away the fundamental right to vote from
many citizens contributing to our society. Once convicted of a felony,
these citizens are forever denied the right to vote. Permanent disen-
franchisement eternalizes every felon's sentence without regard to the
severity and nature of the crime committed. Narrow margins of victory
in national elections highlight the need to ensure increased participation
in the democratic process. It is long past time that the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the states realize that to permit the permanent disen-
franchisement of felons to continue is to support the unconstitutional
exclusion of an outcome-determinative number of voters.7
II.
A.
Felons are deprived of several benefits accorded to non-felons.
Collateral sentencing consequences include prohibitions on holding pub-
lic office, serving on a jury, possessing handguns and gaining certain
occupational licenses.8 Policymakers and citizens alike may agree that
felons should lose certain rights after completing their sentences. How-
ever, the right to vote is so fundamental to our democratic society that
voting should receive special protection.9
The disenfranchisement of convicts has a long history dating to
ancient Greece, where "[c]riminals pronounced infamous were prohib-
ited from appearing in court, voting, making speeches, attending assem-
blies, and serving in the army."'" The ancient English concept of
6. See, e.g., Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on
the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145 (1994); Note, The
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "the Purity of the Ballot Box,"
102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993).
7. The United States would not be the trailblazer of reform, as other industrialized
democracies have evolved functional alternatives already. See Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing
Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an
Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000).
8. For further discussion regarding collateral sentencing, see Nora V. Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, II
STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 153 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
10. Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L.
REV. 929, 941 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
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outlawry, where a person branded an outlaw was stripped of the right to
seek legal protection for his life or property, promoted the belief that:
He who breaks the law has gone to war with the community; the
community goes to war with him. It is the right and duty of every
man to pursue him, to ravage his land, to bum his house, to hunt him
down like a wild beast and slay him; for a wild beast he is; not
merely is he a "friendless man," he is a wolf."
Society became more civilized, yet felon disenfranchisement persisted.
During the European Enlightenment:
[C]rininals lost civil rights under bills of attainder, and were stripped
of the power to transfer property through the doctrine of corruption of
the blood, which was based on the fiction that the criminal's act was
evidence that he and his entire family were corrupt and therefore
unworthy of being feudal tenants. 12
Unfortunately, the subtle influences of the "corruption of the blood" the-
ory linger in contemporary racial profiling techniques that are funda-
mentally based on similar propensity rationales. The criminal justice
system, through profiling, tends to allow the acts of persons of a certain
race to speak for all members of that race-a corruption of the skin.
There are four classical justifications for disenfranchising felons
that can be separated into a pair of policy and a pair of social theory
rationales. The policy reasons, as enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, emanate from a belief that "a state has an interest in prevent-
ing persons who have been convicted of serious crimes from participat-
ing in the electoral process or a quasi-metaphysical invocation that the
interest is preservation of the 'purity of the ballot box."" 3 From a pol-
icy perspective, a state's fear in preventing a felon from participating in
the democratic process can arise from the substantive issues for which a
felon may vote. It may also reflect the idea that, having proven them-
selves to be criminals, they cannot be trusted to adhere to the laws gov-
erning the voting process. Thus, the two policy concerns are a belief or
fear that ex-convicts might use their votes to alter the substantive con-
tent or administration of the criminal law and a belief that the disqualifi-
cation of felons is necessary to guard the democratic process against
voter fraud and election offenses.' 4
Even if society truly fears that persons planning to hijack the
United States will do so through the voting process, that fear does not
justify the practice of felon disenfranchisement because denying citizens
11. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 448 (photo. reprint 1923) (2d ed. 1898).
12. Special Project, supra note 10, at 943.
13. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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the right to vote in order to prevent them from voting for certain candi-
dates is repugnant to the Constitution. In Carrington v. Rash,'5 the
Supreme Court clearly held that "fencing out" from the vote a sector of
the population because of the way that sector may vote is unconstitu-
tional. 6 As we will see, however, Carrington does not control the pre-
sent discussion because of the equal protection exception for felon's
voting rights created in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
Although disenfranchisement on the basis of how someone may
cast his ballot is plainly unconstitutional in certain contexts, felon disen-
franchisement is arguably a unique category with its own considerations.
In Green v. Board of Elections,'8 Judge Friendly argued persuasively
that felon disenfranchisement was necessary to prohibit organized crime
from participating in the election of New York district attorneys and
judges empowered with hearing the felons' cases. But the actual offense
dealt with in Green was conspiracy to organize a Communist party for
the purpose of teaching and advocating the overthrow of the United
States government.19 Judge Friendly surely understood the First
Amendment effects of basing his opinion on the rationale that certain
political parties could be excluded from the political process. Further-
more, there is no evidence to suggest that felons base their votes solely,
or even partially, on a candidate's positions on criminal law. Even if
felons did base their votes on issues of substantive criminal law, it does
not follow that felons necessarily would be more likely to vote for more
lenient laws than would the population as a whole, unless one assumes
that all felons are potential recidivists.
Equally unconvincing is the second policy proffered by supporters
of felon disenfranchisement. Having once broken the law, the argument
suggests, felons are more likely to commit election fraud. The blanket
exclusion of all felons for the protection of the ballot box from those
who might commit electoral crimes is severely over-inclusive. Moreo-
ver, every state already has established penalties for election crimes.2 0
In Dunn v. Blumstein,21 the Court conceded that modem systems of
voter registration are sufficient to protect against and to deter fraudulent
evasion of election laws. 2
Two social theory reasons also buttress the policy reasons, but they
15. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
16. Id. at 94.
17. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974).
18. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967).
19. Id. at 447.
20. See Note, supra note 6, at 1303 (citations omitted).
21. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
22. Id. at 345-54.
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add only token legitimacy to felon disenfranchisement. The social the-
ory reasons derive from the social contract theory and the theory of dem-
ocratic competence, both creatures of distinctly Western philosophical
perceptions of citizenship, society, and individual identity.23 Thus, the
first social theory reason justifies disenfranchising felons because they
breached the social contract. Social contract theory explains the forma-
tion and maintenance of society by reference to a hypothetical contract
through which individuals agree to come together under a particular sys-
tem of government.24 Judge Friendly in Green v. Board of Elections
2 5
citing John Locke, argued that the origins of disenfranchisement could
be found in the idea that "a man who breaks the laws he has authorized
his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have been thought
to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering the
compact. ' '26 The foundation to many disenfranchisement opinions citing
the social contract theory is the deliberate nature of a felon's choice to
breach the social contract.27
The fundamental premise of social contract theory requires free-
willed individuals to design a society from an ideal bargaining position,
perhaps even assenting to the particular law in question. 28 Admittedly,
"felons are not disenfranchised based on any immutable characteristic,
such as race, but on their conscious decision to commit an act for which
they assume the risks of detection and punishment. 29 Yet, it is reasona-
ble for a person to reject any contract under which a single breach would
void the entire contract.3 °
Disenfranchisement is imposed equally on all felons without regard
for the relative severity of their crimes. It cannot, therefore, be wholly
proportionate to every single violation. The sentencing period of a trial
properly determines the damages for a breach of the social contract.
Disenfranchisement for life equates to permanent expulsion from the
political community. Moreover, it is doubtful that disenfranchisement
23. For examples of classical liberal political theory, see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough rev. ed., 1976); JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in
THREE ESSAYS (1975); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
24. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 141-86 (J. Plamenatz ed., 1963) (1651); LOCKE,
supra note 23, at 366; RAWLS, supra note 23, at 11-12, 118-92.
25. 380 F.2d 445 (1967).
26. Id. at 45 1.
27. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978); Wesley v. Collins,
605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
28. See Rawls, supra note 23, at 118-92.
29. Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 813.
30. Cf Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(arguing that "it is hardly likely" that free individuals would enter into a contract in which a single
failure to execute payment by one party would constitute a forfeiture of all goods previously
obtained under the contract).
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as a punitive measure significantly deters lawbreakers given its
extremely low visibility.31 The criminal code normally does not men-
tion felon disenfranchisement; instead it appears in those sections of the
constitution or statutory code addressing voter qualifications.32
A second social theory reason asserts that felons must be excluded
because only the virtuous are morally competent to participate in gov-
erning society. Under this rationale, felons lose the right to vote because
they have demonstrated an inherent lack of virtue on which the survival
of society depends. According to this civic republican theory, political
competence has a moral dimension.3 3 Confining fault to only the indi-
vidual obscures the complexity of separating the roots of crime from
their entanglement with social structures. Felons cannot be excluded
because they are forever incapable of casting votes in accordance with
the common good, when no such common good exists beyond the sub-
jective morals determined through particular religious and cultural val-
ues. Our Constitution envisions no such common good beyond what the
democratic process produces. By disenfranchising felons, we guarantee
that they will not cast votes for the common good.
The diversity of cultures and religions in the United States requires
determining the common good through a democratic process that incor-
porates the full spectrum of political beliefs by permitting all citizens to
vote. "Our society does not, rightly does not, accept the notion of a
discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles. 34
Nevertheless, the second social reason appears in one of the most
frequently cited cases on felon disenfranchisement, Washington v.
State.35 After recognizing that the right to vote is denied "almost univer-
sally to idiots, insane persons, and minors, upon the ground that they
31. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[a]s a deterrent
device this sanction [loss of citizenship] would appear of little effect, for the offender, if not
deterred by thought of the specific penalties of long imprisonment or even death, is not very likely
to be swayed from his course by the prospect of expatriation.").
32. See Note, supra note 6, at 1307 n.39; ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182; ARIZ. CONST. art. VII,
§ 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-101.5 (1979); DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1701 (1981); FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (West 1982); IOWA CONST.
art. 2, § 5 (infamous crimes); Ky. CONST. § 145; MD. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. ELEC. CODE ANN.
art. 33, § 3-4 (1984) (second offense only); Miss. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (murder, rape, bribery,
theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or
bigamy only); NEv. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11 (treason, bribery, and election
offenses only); N.M. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (infamous crimes); UTAH
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (treason and election offenses only); VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; WYo. CONST. art.
6, § 6.)
33. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
82-143 (1967); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 38, 49-50
(1986).
34. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980).
35. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
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lack the requisite judgment and discretion which fit them for the exer-
cise," the court declared that:
[T]he manifest purpose of denying suffrage to felons is to preserve
the purity of the ballot box. A person convicted of a felony, or other
base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to vote upon
terms of equality with freemen who are clothed by the State with the
toga of political citizenship.36
First, this point of view demonstrates an arrogance that oversimplifies
the virtues of democracy. Every offender of a crime of great moral tur-
pitude is not convicted or even arrested because law enforcement is
arguably prejudiced against those with less political and economic stat-
ure. Felon disenfranchisement is an ineffective guardian of the ballot
box because the alleged purity of the ballot box is a fiction.
In the same vein, in Kronlund v. Honstein,7 a Georgia federal dis-
trict court reasoned that a state has an interest in preserving the integrity
of the electoral process by excluding those persons with "proven antiso-
cial behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's
aims."38 Accordingly, a state "may prohibit idiots and insane persons,
as well as, those convicted of certain offenses from participating in her
elections."39 The Fifth Circuit likewise concluded that a state may
exclude ex-offenders because they, "like insane persons, have raised
questions about their ability to vote responsibly. 40 This trend stereo-
types felons as lacking sanity despite an illogical connection between
committing a crime and sanity.
Furthermore, the contemporary rejection of systematic exclusion is
exemplified in the Supreme Court's holding that "fencing out" from the
vote a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is
unconstitutional.4' Given this and other precedent, the Supreme Court
cleverly avoided relying on the quartet of policy and social theory rea-
sons that are inadequate justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws,
in light of modem equal protection jurisprudence.4" After all, "[n]ot
everything that was assumed to be constitutional in 1868 remains
immune to the Equal Protection Clause (assuming it ever was)."43
36. Id. at 585.
37. 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
38. Id. at 73.
39. Id.
40. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978).
41. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
42. The Court has explicitly held that "differences of opinion cannot justify for excluding
(any) group from . . . 'the franchise."' See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-706
(1969); see also Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970).
43. John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2001).
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B.
The Court in Richardson v. Ramirez" concluded it was the intent
of the post-Civil War Congress to immortalize felon disenfranchisement
in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, deduced an implied affirmation of felon disenfranchise-
ment from a clause that enunciates the penalty of reduced Congressional
representation for states that deny the right to vote to every man of
twenty-one years, except men convicted of treason or other crime.4 6
Justice Rehnquist determined that if Congress was willing to provide an
exception to the penalty of reduced representation under section 2 so
long as states enfranchised everyone except felons and traitors, Congress
could not have intended to render felon disenfranchisement an unconsti-
tutional violation of equal protection under section 1. However, "Sec-
tion 2 says nothing stronger on the subject of denying felons the
franchise than in 1868 it was assumed to be constitutional."47 The fail-
ure of the Court in Richardson lay in its refusal to apply a modem con-
stitutional analysis in accord with contemporary equal protection
standards.
By carving a constitutional haven, the Court avoided the strict scru-
tiny typically due denials of the vote.48 Justice Rehnquist eliminated the
need to offer a compelling state interest and instead concluded that it
was Congress' intent to immunize felon disenfranchisement. 49 Even in
1868, though, people clearly perceived the potential threat to equal pro-
44. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives of
Congress, the Executive or Judicial officers of a state, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any inhabitants of such state, being twenty one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.
U.S. Co sT. amend. XIV, § 2. (emphasis added). It may also be significant that the oft-used
phrase 'deny or abridge' in this clause is split, unlike the other amendments (XV, XIX, XXIV,
XXVI) which seem to use the words interchangeably. The phrase which Justice Rehnquist relies
upon for Congressional sanction of felon disenfranchisement appears after 'abridge,' possibly
indicating that the permanent disenfranchisement of felons was not what Congress intended in
drafting this section of the Amendment. Behind the word 'denial' are the specific qualifications -
males and twenty-one years of age - that were later modified by Constitutional amendments.
47. Ely, supra note 43, at 1195.
48. See Demleitner, supra note 7.
49. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 41-56.
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tection of permitting states to disenfranchise felons. In 1868, one pre-
scient senator from Missouri requested that the phrase "under laws
equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State" be introduced in
an amendment to the enabling act readmitting Arkansas to the Union
shortly after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.5" The Senator
expressed alarm that, without the language, Arkansas might misuse the
exception for felons to disenfranchise Negroes:
The bill authorizes men to be deprived of the right to vote "as a pun-
ishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof
they shall have been duly convicted." There is one fundamental
defect in that, and that is that there is no requirement that the laws
under which men shall be duly convicted of these crimes shall be
equally applicable to all the inhabitants of the State. It is a very easy
thing in a State to make one set of laws applicable to white men, and
another set of laws applicable to colored men.5'
Absent a Constitutional amendment, constitutional approval of felon dis-
enfranchisement in section 2 forever precludes felons from invoking
equal protection under section 1, even where the criminal justice system
enforces its laws in a racially discriminatory fashion.
In Richardson, authors of numerous amicus briefs argued that felon
disenfranchisement is outmoded and suggested that the more modem
view favors a process of rehabilitation returning the felon to his role in
society as a fully participating citizen.52 The Court concluded, however,
that these points should be addressed to a legislative forum that could
properly "weigh and balance them against those advanced in support of
California's present constitutional provisions."53 Justice Rehnquist hur-
dled the potentially contentious equal protection issue stating:
But it is not for us to choose one set of values over the other ... if the
view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensi-
ble one, presumably the people of the State of California will ulti-
mately come around to that view. And if they do not do so, their
failure is some evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides
to the argument.54
Yet, without Federal intervention the southern States may never have
50. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2600 (1868).
51. Id.
52. Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Opposition to Certiorari, in Class
of County Clerks and Registrars of Voters of California v. Ramirez, No. 73-324; National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections, Standard 16.17, p.
592 (1973); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: Corrections 89-90 (1967); California League of Women Voters, Policy Statement,
Feb. 16, 1972.
53. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55.
54. Id.
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"come around" to abolish slavery, desegregate schools, or permit Afri-
can-Americans to vote. Most importantly, deferring to a democratic
process that fails to include all voters misses the entire point. Without
the right to vote, felons are unable to voice their views even if any such
popular referendum on the issue occurred. Moreover, the majority of
states (and the California Supreme Court in Richardson) determined that
permanently disenfranchising felons is disloyal to democracy and mod-
em conceptions of a moral penal system."
Justice Marshall, in his Richardson dissent, stated that disen-
franchisement "doubtless has been brought forward into modem statutes
without fully realizing the effect of its literal significance or the extent of
its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government."56 Unfor-
tunately, this effect was both intended and realized. The legislative his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that a proposed section 2 of
the Amendment went to a joint committee containing only the phrase
"participation in rebellion" but emerged with "participation in rebellion
or other crime" tacked on.57 Justice Marshall concluded that excluding a
class of citizens from the franchise is constitutional if the state can show
that the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
The state interests that California proffered were prevention of subver-
sive voting and prevention of voter fraud. Justice Marshall reasoned that
felon disenfranchisement was not necessary to promote either state
interest. 8
The Supreme Court has observed that the Equal Protection Clause
is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.59 Furthermore,
the Court has "never been confined to historic notions of equality, any
more than it has restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights."60 Since
voting is a fundamental right and the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause can evolve, the Richardson Court should have applied strict scru-
55. Id. at 24. The Sentencing Project maintains a complete list detailing how and which states
disenfranchise felons at http://www.sentencingproject.org. Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi and Virginia are the only states that continue to disenfranchise all felons. Several
other states have qualified disenfranchisement that depends on how many felonies have been
committed prior or how long the felon has been released from prison.
56. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank,
41 Okla. 728 (1914)).
57. Id. at 73. See also Howard Itkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-offender's
Right to Vote: Background and Developments, II AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 746-47 n.158 (1973).
58. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 78-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966); see also Dillenburg v.
Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that "constitutional concepts of equal
protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber.").
60. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (citation omitted).
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tiny. This would have required California to rely on the traditional but
currently suspect reasons for felon disenfranchisement.
Finally, in Hunter v. Underwood,6 the Supreme Court struck down
section 182 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchised
felons because it violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the
Hunter Court explicitly declined to reconsider Richardson's holding that
felons may be constitutionally disenfranchised.62 Though the Court
struck down the "moral turpitude" section of Alabama's 1901 disen-
franchisement provision after holding the impact and the intent of the
section was to prevent blacks from voting, what oddly emerged from the
opinion was a general acceptance of the practice. This legacy is espe-
cially troubling because the Court agreed that the Alabama constitu-
tional provision discriminated against African-Americans. However, the
provision's effect was not the Court's reason for finding it violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the Court stated the provision was
unconstitutional because the legislature intended to use it to discriminate
against African-Americans. Thus, under Hunter, a state law that merely
has the effect of disenfranchising felons does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Like Alabama and other southern states, Florida adopted its original
disenfranchisement provision after enactment of the Civil War Amend-
ments. In some states during that period, only the conviction of crimes
believed to be committed more often by African Americans resulted in
disenfranchisement. 63 For example, South Carolina legislators deter-
mined that the following were crimes "which [the Negro] was especially
prone": theft, arson, attempted rape, adultery, "wife beating," and
"housebreaking. 64 On the other hand, crimes supposedly committed
equally or more frequently by whites, such as murder, did not result in
disenfranchisement.65
Only six states continue to disenfranchise felons for life. The polit-
ical parity born of our dual party system magnifies the need for States to
remedy the racially discriminatory impact of felon disenfranchisement
so that every potential vote is counted. Each new challenge to felon dis-
enfranchisement laws highlights the impunity of states that straddle the
line between equal protection and racial discrimination. State disen-
franchisement laws overtly moonlighting as electoral mechanisms
61. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
62. See id. at 233.
63. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Report on Voting Irregularities in Florida
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geared to produce racially discriminatory results face invalidation after
Hunter. Unfortunately, Hunter places a high burden on plaintiffs to
prove that the state intended to racially discriminate through its felon
disenfranchisement laws. Transparently incriminating statements like
those of the Alabama Convention cannot speak for the legislature of
every state. It is very difficult for a plaintiff today to prove that a state's
legislature from the early 20th century had a particular intention. Con-
gress responded to this difficulty with the Voting Rights Act of 196566
to protect voters against ingenious, sophisticated or facially uninten-
tional racial discrimination.
C.
Since ratification of the Civil War Amendments, the Amendments
have provided inadequate protection from facially neutral voting
requirements that perpetuate the denial of the right to vote on the basis
of race. Nearly a century passed before Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to respond to the increasing sophistication with
which racial minorities were denied the right to vote. Although Con-
gress intended for the Voting Rights Act to put an end to the states'
"unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution, ' 67 only the
1982 Amendments cemented the possibility of challenging felon disen-
franchisement under the Act.6 8
The impetus for the 1982 Amendments was the Supreme Court's
plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden,69 which placed a burden of prov-
ing discriminatory intent on plaintiffs challenging a state election law.70
Congress reacted because proof of intent was unacceptably difficult for
plaintiffs to obtain in most voting rights cases and because the states for
too long had undermined the spirit of the Civil War Amendments.7 '
Under the 1982 "results test," a state election law violates the Act:
[I]f, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by mem-
bers of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represent-
66. Act, supra note 5.
67. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
68. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b) (2000)).
69. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
70. Id.
71. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15 (1982), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N 177, 192 (1981).
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atives of their choice.72
African-Americans are a class of citizens protected by section
1973(a) because subsection (a) prohibits any "standard ... imposed or
applied by any State . . . in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color . . ..
To prove a state violated the Act, a plaintiff "must show a causal
connection between the challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited
discriminatory result."'74 The "results test" permits challenging racial
discrimination when proof of intent is unavailable. Discriminatory vote
dilution is a step removed from outright vote denial because it succeeds
in diminishing "the force of minority votes that were duly cast and
counted. 75 Where, as in Florida, a state draws lines for its voting dis-
tricts according to population figures that exclude disenfranchised felons
the actual number of voters in a district may be significantly lower than
projected. Thus, the potential number of minority voters in a district
will be inflated and, as a result, the minorities who can vote will have
their votes diluted. If a particular state's felon disenfranchisement law
causes a racially discriminatory result such as vote dilution, the Act
should apply.
In Baker v. Cuomo,76 a felon challenging New York's felon disen-
franchisement statute alleged that it disproportionately deprived African-
Americans and Latinos of their right to vote, and thus violated the Act.77
The district court refused to apply the Act's "results test" to the New
York statute and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, 78 the Second Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, agreed that the "results test" could not apply to the
New York statute because it would raise "serious constitutional ques-
tions regarding the scope of Congress' authority to enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment," and would "alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment."79 The court argued that in order for Congress to constitutionally
alter this balance, it must be "unmistakably clear" that Congress
intended the "results test" to apply to New York's felon disenfranchise-
ment statutes.8 °
72. Id.
73. See id. § 1973(a).
74. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
75. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 896 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
76. 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
77. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2)-(5) (1982).
78. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 922.
80. Id.
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Similarly, in Wesley v. Collins,8 the Sixth Circuit rejected a vote
dilution challenge to Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement statute. The
Wesley court held that although the complaint alleged numerous factors
relevant to the totality of the circumstances, the district court correctly
dismissed the complaint. To the Wesley Court, the chief, and therefore
determinative, factor to consider in the case was the important social
goal proffered to justify felon disenfranchisement.82 Unlike the Second
Circuit's concern for federalism, to justify felon disenfranchisement the
Sixth Circuit relied on the first social theory reason above, Locke's
social contract theory.
83
To be sure, Congress understood that the "results test" might pro-
hibit a practice traditionally permitted in the United States. In fact,
when Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act, both Judiciary Commit-
tees explained that felon disenfranchisement laws were not affected by
the ban on historically discriminatory "test[s] or device[s]," including
the prohibition on tests for "good moral character." 4 Congress to date
has not issued a legislative finding that felon disenfranchisement is a
pretext or proxy for racial discrimination. Arguably, for purposes of
challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Act, the lack of a Con-
gressional finding might be determinative.85 But, in each specific chal-
lenge a district court confronts peculiar facts and statistics that, if
individually reviewed by Congress, might warrant such a legislative
finding.
For instance, had the Baker court reviewed the statute under the
"results test," the facts would demonstrate that Blacks and Latinos com-
bined account for approximately twenty-two percent of New York's
population, but account for eighty-two percent of New York's prison
population.86 Furthermore, approximately seventy-five percent of New
York's prison population consists of persons from fourteen different
81. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 1261.
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(c); See S. REP. No. 89-162, at 24, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2508, 2562 (joint views of Senators Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, Burdick, Tydings,
Dirksen, Hruska, Fong, Scott, and Javits) ("This definition [of the impermissible 'good moral
character' test] would not result in the proscription of the frequent requirement of States and
political subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of
a felony .... It applies where lack of good moral character is defined in terms of conviction of
lesser crimes."); H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 25-26, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457
(The Act "does not proscribe a requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State that
an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony.").
85. Cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130 ("Congress made no legislative findings that
the 21-year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of
race.").
86. See Baker v. Pataki, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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state assembly districts that are situated in New York City.87 On their
face, these statistics suggest a strong vote dilution case, but the Second
Circuit disagreed.
In Farrakhan v. Locke,88 a district court disagreed with the Second
Circuit's holding that the plain statement rule applied to the Act. Under
this rule, if legislation could alter the usual constitutional balance
between the federal government and the states, Congress's intention
regarding the application of the statute must be made "unmistakably
clear."89 Even if the 1965 Congress did not intend for the Act to apply
to felon disenfranchisement statutes, it is well accepted that enforcement
of the Civil War Amendments changed the usual constitutional balance
between the states and the federal government.90 The Fourteenth
Amendment was specifically created to enable the federal government to
police states for violations of the constitutional rights of racial
minorities.
The plain statement rule is inapplicable to the Voting Rights Act
because the Supreme Court consistently has recognized that Congress
has the power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
through the Voting Rights Act, "despite the burdens those measures
placed on the states." '9 Furthermore, the 1982 Amendments were a con-
gressional response to the Court's effort to make proving a violation
under the Act more difficult. The Voting Rights Act is a byproduct of
the Civil War Amendments, which inevitably altered the federal/state
balance of power as contemplated by the original Constitution. Addi-
tionally, since the Civil War there have been six Constitutional amend-
ments specifically designed to increase participation in the vote.92
Given the constitutional foundation upon which the Act relies, I
suggest the "plain statement" rule is redundant as applied to the Voting
Rights Act. 93 But even if a district court were persuaded that the "plain
statement" rule is inapplicable, a further question arises regarding
whether the Act's "results test" as applied to felon disenfranchisement
laws is a constitutional exercise of Congress's remedial powers. The
power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments is not
87. Id.
88. 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997).
89. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (citations omitted).
90. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 127-28.
91. City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
92. See supra note 2. Further evidence of a trend towards popularizing our democracy is the
Seventeenth Amendment which provides for election of Senators "by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII.
93. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
"plain statement" rule should not apply to the Act's "results test").
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unlimited. There are at least three limitations.94 First, Congress may not
by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the
power granted to Congress was not intended to strip the states of their
power to govern themselves or to convert our national government of
enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority
over every inch of the nation. Third, Congress may only "enforce" the
provisions of the amendments and may do so only by "appropriate
legislation." 95
The interclausal immunity 96 relied upon by Justice Rehnquist in
Richardson seemingly leads to the conclusion that application of the
Act's "results test" to felon disenfranchisement would contradict section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, stripping an individual of
the right to vote for conviction of a felony is constitutional unless Rich-
ardson is overruled. In Hunter, the Supreme Court clarified that states
intentionally cannot use felon disenfranchisement as a tool to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.97 After the Civil War, states began cloaking
racial discrimination in facially neutral statutes. Congress eventually
enacted the Voting Rights Act to protect against the racially discrimina-
tory impact of specific electoral laws. Thus, specific challenges alleging
egregiously discriminatory impact require that courts reevaluate the par-
ticular constitutional implications and legality under the Voting Rights
Act of state felon disenfranchisement laws that persist in serving the
duplicitous goal of excluding a significant percentage of a suspect class.
D.
Florida is ripe for judicial intervention under both the Voting
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because of the unusually large population of minority voters that
are disenfranchised. In 2002, however, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida disagreed and granted summary
judgment to prevent a class of felons from proving that Florida's disen-
franchisement provision perpetuates racial discrimination.98 In Johnson
v. Bush, the plaintiffs alleged that felon disenfranchisement in Florida
spawned from an intent to discriminate against African-Americans and
that it had produced a racially discriminatory impact by diluting the
minority vote.99 The district court, like the Supreme Court before it,
94. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 266-67.
95. Id.
96. See Ely, supra note 43. Professor Ely criticizes Rehnquist's reasoning of the relationship
between the first two sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
97. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 236 (1985).
98. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
99. Plaintiff's Complaint at IT 64, 69, Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla.
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declined to explore the current effect of felon disenfranchisement and its
relationship to progressive notions of equal protection.
The statistics in Florida are disturbing. The Johnson plaintiffs
alleged that nine percent of voting-age African-Americans and fifteen
percent (twenty-four percent counting inmates) of voting-age African-
American males in Florida are disenfranchised as a result of a felony
conviction.'" Of all the felons disenfranchised in Florida, nearly thirty
percent are African-Americans, although African-Americans make up
only fifteen percent of Florida's population. 101 Furthermore, nearly five
percent of voting-age citizens in Florida are denied the vote as a result of
a felony conviction.'0 2
The history of felon disenfranchisement in Florida is equally dis-
turbing. Florida legislators after the Civil War, through the 1868 Consti-
tution, extended permanent disenfranchisement to all felons.'0 3 Despite
the gradual repeal over the next century of similar disenfranchisement
provisions in 42 states, in 1968 the Florida legislature instead redrafted
its constitution to eliminate the appearance that it continued to support
its racist past. Section 4(a) of Article VI of the current Florida Constitu-
tion provides that "no person convicted of a felony.., shall be qualified
to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disa-
bility."'0 4 The historical motivations underlying the original provision
outlive the nominal redraft whose sole purpose was to eliminate the
appearance of discrimination in the original provision without changing
its practical effect.
The district court in Johnson reasoned that "a facially neutral provi-
sion.., might overcome its odious origin"'' 0 and "remove the discrimi-
natory taint associated with the original version."' 0 6  History
demonstrates, however, that southern states confronted with federal
mandate to eradicate racism will engineer less conspicuous methods to
accomplish racial discrimination. ' 7 The likelihood of a continued effort
at racial discrimination seems just as plausible as the instantaneous dis-
2002) (No. 00-3542), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/
flacomplaint92 I 00.pdf.
100. Id. at [ 46.
101. Id. at 1 48.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Id. at 1 30.
104. FLA. CONST. art. VI, §4(a).
105. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting Cotton v. Fordice,
157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998)).
106. Id.
107. Literacy tests, poll taxes, and white-only primaries eventually were abolished as indirect
means of racial indiscrimination. See Voting Rights Act of 1965; Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
513 (2000).
20031 1333
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
appearance of institutionalized racism after the mere redraft of a provi-
sion that had been used for a century to accomplish constitutionally
unacceptable results. Felon disenfranchisement in Florida is rooted
deeply in racial discrimination.
Following the Civil War, the Florida legislature convened to draft a
new constitution. The 1865 Constitution did not permanently disen-
franchise felons, but it granted suffrage only to white men.1"8 Defeat in
the Civil War and Congressional abolition of slavery had little impact on
Florida's willingness to integrate blacks. William Marvin, the provi-
sional governor after the Civil War, succeeded in persuading the 1865
convention that, while blacks were free, freedom did not include the
right to vote. 9 The legislative efforts to disenfranchise newly freed
slaves were widespread. For instance, the year slaves were set free, the
1865 convention and the legislature authorized the arrest of vagrants and
able-bodied persons with no visible means of support." 0 Both crimes
were punishable by up to a year of hard labor. As a result, ex-slavehold-
ers regained the benefit of free labor as a result of these crimes, which
represented transparent institutional attempts to perpetuate slavery.
When a new governor was elected, he reiterated the government's
determination to "never accede to the demand for Negro suffrage.""' In
1866, the Florida legislature rejected ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically because it provided that congressional repre-
sentation would be reduced in proportion to the adult men denied the
right to vote. " 2 Only in 1867, after Congress placed Florida under mili-
tary control, commanded suffrage to all men, and required ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, did Florida accede to the conditions for re-
admittance to the Union.' '3
The 1868 Constitution contained a list of disenfranchising crimes
that included larceny, whereas earlier constitutions disenfranchised peo-
ple convicted only of bribery, perjury and other infamous crimes." 4
Even though blacks represented a small percentage of Florida's prison
population before the Civil War, between 1872 and 1888 black men rep-
resented from seventy-seven to eighty-eight percent of persons in state
prisons." 15 Moreover, between fifty-one and sixty percent of individuals










DEMOCRACY FROZEN IN DEVONIAN AMBER
incarcerated in state prisons from 1872 to 1878 were convicted of lar-
ceny and felony theft-the very crimes intended by the post-Civil War
legislature to target and disenfranchise newly freed slaves." 6 In 1885,
Florida voters approved yet another constitution. Unfortunately, the
criminal disenfranchisement provisions of the 1868 Constitution
remained virtually untouched while similar racially discriminatory
"codes" were added, such as a poll tax."'
The 1965 redraft eliminated the list of disqualifying crimes, but
replaced it with the broad exclusion of all felons." 8 Under Hunter, a
state's disenfranchisement law can be invalidated if there is proof of
racially discriminatory intent. In Hunter, intent was demonstrated by
reference to transcripts from the Alabama constitutional convention
adopting the statute, where delegates vociferously announced their intent
to disenfranchise African-Americans through any means constitutionally
acceptable. Transcripts from the 1865 Florida constitutional convention
also express a desire to deny the vote to African-Americans." 9
Furthermore, Florida shares Alabama's history of racial discrimina-
tion in the franchise, applying such devices as poll taxes, educational
tests, and lists of disqualifying crimes targeted at African-Americans.
Only four years before the redrafting of the felon disenfranchisement
provision, Florida argued to the U.S. Supreme Court in McLaughlin v.
Florida2 ° that the Fourteenth Amendment had been improperly ratified
and therefore was not part of the Constitution.'"' Still, the district court
suggested the 1968 redraft eradicated all remnants of racism in the felon
disenfranchisement provision and observed that any current racial
impact due to the law was a result of at most "a flaw with the criminal
justice system, not the disenfranchisement provision." 122
In contrast to the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 2003 reversed a lower court decision refusing to consider evidence of
discrimination in the criminal justice system because it was not signifi-
cant for purposes of the "totality of the circumstances" analysis used in
determining whether a challenged voting practice results in a denial of
116. Id.
117. Id. 143.
118. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 97.041(2), 98.093, 98.0975 (repealed 2001), 944.292.
119. Plaintiffs Complaint at 34, Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No.
00-3542).
120. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
121. John Hart Ely, If at First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CoNsT. COMMENT. 215, 219
n.12 (1998).
122. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting Farrakhan v.
Locke, No. 96-76-RHW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2000)).
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minority voting rights under section 2.123 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that a section 2 "totality of the circumstances" inquiry requires courts to
consider how a challenged voting practice interacts with external factors
such as "social and historical conditions" to result in denial of the right
to vote on account of race or color. All branches of the Government are
potential violators of civil rights. The courts' role is to ensure that no
component of the state perpetuates racism.
In Florida, the executive branch also plays a role in determining the
racial impact of felon disenfranchisement. A felon can petition the Flor-
ida Clemency Board for the restoration of his civil rights.'2 4 Although,
technically, restoration is available, it is illusory. As of 2002, a backlog
of over 40,000 petitions clogged the process of restoring civil rights.
2 5
Under Florida's Rules of Executive Clemency, a felon is entitled to
automatic restoration of civil rights if he has served his sentence,
demonstrated that he is not a capital or habitual felon, and paid restitu-
tion to the victim.' 26 But in the end, the Clemency Board retains abso-
lute discretion to grant or even review an application. Pressure from
various groups, including the ACLU, persuaded Florida during the sum-
mer of 2003 to enter into a settlement that would reinstate voting rights
for at least 30,000 felons whose petitions were previously denied
through the application process. In addition, the settlement simplifies
the clemency procedure, ensures that the Florida Department of Correc-
tions automatically reinstates voting rights of the felons who qualify to
have their rights restored without a hearing and, most importantly,
requires that eligible felons be mailed an application. Prior to the settle-
ment, felons were not informed of the process, which reinstates fewer
than a thousand felons a year.
127
After incidents of voter fraud in the 1997 Miami mayoral election,
including votes cast in the names of deceased persons, the Florida legis-
lature employed a private agency to assist in purging the voter rolls.'
28
The United States Commission on Civil Rights investigated the perform-
ance of the private agency during the 2000 election and concluded that
"[t]he Florida legislature's decision to privatize its list maintenance pro-
cedures without establishing effective clear guidance for these private
123. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2003).
124. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 5(I)(E), 5(11), 9(A)(2), 9(A)(3), available at http://
www.state.fl.us/fpc/execlem/rulesofexecutiveclemency3-27-03.pdf.
125. Restore Felons' Right To Vote, MIAMI HERALD, March 4, 2002, at 6B.
126. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 5(I)(E), 5(11), 9(A)(2), 9(A)(3), available at http://
www.state.fl.us/fpc/execlem/rulesofexecutiveclemency3-27-03.pdf.
127. Andrea Robinson, Ex-felons May See Voting Rights Restored, MIAMI HERALD, July 25,
2003, at IA.
128. See Report on Voting Irregularities, supra note 63.
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efforts from the highest levels, coupled with the absence of uniform and
reliable verification procedures, resulted in countless eligible voters
being deprived of their right to vote." '129 Thus, the Florida legislature
succeeded in indirectly preventing individuals from participating in the
2000 election, even those who had regained their civil rights.
Several actions would exhibit a legislative intent to remedy the
racially discriminatory impact of permanent felon disenfranchisement.
At a minimum, more money could be appropriated for the Clemency
Board to clear the backlog of applications. 30 Alternatively, the Florida
legislature might have utilized the 2002 decennial redistricting process
to apportion Florida's voting districts to compensate for the vote dilution
created by permanent felon disenfranchisement. Of course, reapportion-
ment is not the preferred method because it again requires accounting
for race. 13' One solution stands out - complete enfranchisement.
III.
The disenfranchisement of felons "necessarily depletes a minority
community's voting strength over time by consistently placing a greater
proportion of minority than majority voters under a voting disability at
any given time."' 32 Traces of the intentional discrimination that origi-
nally motivated felon disenfranchisement linger in the United States. In
Florida, racial bloc voting and partisan parity characterize current electo-
ral politics, and history has proved that even the slightest electoral error
may alter the future of our country or world.' 33 The long history of
election failures in Florida support the conclusion that the 2000 presi-
dential election is unlikely to be the last time Florida's electoral system
is exposed for its embarrassing failures and miserable inadequacies. 34
129. Id.
130. In the 2002 Florida Senate budget proposal, State Sen. Kendrick Meek earmarked $2.5
million specifically to pay for an additional 25 workers in the Clemency Board in an effort to
remedy the bureaucratic injustice. Restore Ex-Felons' Right To Vote, MIAMi HERALD, Mar. 4,
2002, at 6B.
131. For a complete description of the methodology used in the 2002 Florida redistricting
process, see Florida House Redistricting Committee, at http://www.floridaredistricting.org.
132. Virginia E. Hench, "The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of
Minority Voters," 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 767 (1998).
133. USA TODAY, in conjunction with several Florida newspapers, conducted a final vote tally
that depending on the methodology had either George Bush or Al Gore winning by a margin
under 500 votes. See Dennis Cauchon & Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the
Election, USA TODAY, May 11, 2001, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2001-05-10-recountmain.htm.
134. See Scheer v. City of Miami, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Beckstrom v. Volusia
County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998); Flack v. Graham, 453 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1984);
Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1984); Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So.
2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
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Simply, felon disenfranchisement is anachronistic. The policy and
social rationales supporting it in the past are today unconstitutional.
Contemporary notions of justice and morality progressively replace legal
relics of ages that embraced inequality, racial discrimination, and human
rights abuses. Perhaps for Justice Rehnquist it is sufficient that the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted the disenfranchisement
of felons. They also accepted the exclusive enfranchisement of men.
The Equal Protection Clause has evolved with society, 135 and the time
has arrived to nullify the felon disenfranchisement laws that perpetuate
purposes offensive to modem constitutional values.
The traditional reasons for supporting felon disenfranchisement rest
on an irrational fear that ultra-lenient and sinister laws will result from
enfranchising felons. People understandably argue that enfranchising
felons might cause the defeat of certain candidates who otherwise would
win. People in power are predictably reluctant to concede even a modi-
cum of power. But perfecting the democratic process is anathema only
to those attempting to freeze the 19th century in Devonian amber.
CARLOS M. PORTUGAL*
135. See generally, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
I (1967).
* J.D. candidate 2003.
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